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Appealability of Stay Orders
in the Federal Courts
The federal courts have been making widespread use of
stay orders in segregation cases and in contract disputes
involving arbitration clauses. Consequently, the requisites
for appealability of these orders under section 1292(a)(1)
of the United States Judicial Code, which make inter-
locutory injunctions appealable, has become an increasing-
ly important question. The author of this Note examines
the requirements that the Supreme Court has placed on
interlocutory appeal of stay orders. He suggests that in-
stead of determining their appealability on a technical ar-
rangement of claims, federal courts should decide this
question in light of the policies underlying the enactment of
section 1292(a)(1).
Since the first Judiciary Act of 1789, a historic condition of re-
view in federal appellate procedure has been the requirement that
an appeal can only be taken from a final judgment.' A final judg-
ment is one that disposes of a whole case on its merits, leaving
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.2 The pur-
pose underlying the rule limiting review to final decisions is to
prevent piecemeal litigation. A multiplicity of interlocutory ap-
peals could hinder the orderly administration of a trial, result in
vexatious delay and oppressive costs that might be ruinous to a
party, and seriously burden the appellate courts.'
Despite this strong policy underlying the rule of finality, a party
may suffer irreparable injury if he cannot appeal the denial of an
interlocutory order until a final judgment has been entered. For
example, an improvidently issued injunction may deprive him of
the possession and control of his property or business for the du-
ration of the suit. Consequently, interlocutory injunctions have
been made appealable under section 1292(a) (1) of the Judicial
1.
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all fi-
nal decisions of the district courts of the United States .. . except
where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958).
2. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949);
Arnold v. W. B. Guimarin & Co., 263 U.S. 427, 434 (1923); Bostwick
v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U.S. 3-4 (1882). But cf. Note, 75 HARV. L REV.
351, 353 (1961), which states that "no single definition will suffice."
3. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE LJ.
539,550-51 (1932).
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Code.4 Subsequent to the enactment of this section, it was made
clear that interlocutory orders granting or denying injunctions
were subject to appeal.' It is not clear, however, whether an
important type of interlocutory order, the stay order in a fed-
eral proceeding, is appealable under section 1292(a)(1 ). These
orders may be granted, for example, to determine the order of
trial,7 to allow a state court to interpret a state statute,8 or to al-
low a dispute to be submitted to arbitration.' The importance of
these orders may be illustrated by the segregation cases, in which
litigants will often seek stay orders so that a sympathetic state
tribunal may construe a state statute under question."0 Also, the
United States Arbitration Act authorizes a federal court to issue a
stay order where there is a written agreement in a contract to sub-
mit disputes arising under it to arbitration." It is the purpose of this
Note to examine the extent to which stay orders constitute inter-
locutory injunctions appealable under section 1292(a) (1 ).
The issue of stay order appealability was first raised in Enelow
v. New York Life Ins. Co.,'" a case arising before the merger of
law and equity. The plaintiff had brought an action at law upon a
4. Statutory provision for interlocutory appeals was first introduced in
1891 when the courts of appeals were established as intermediate courts.
26 Stat. 826, 828 (1891). Amendments have been made periodically,
and at the present time, § 1292(a)(1) of the Judicial Code grants ap-
pellate jurisdiction to courts of appeals from:
Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States . . .
granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct re-
view may be had in the Supreme Court ....
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1958).
Although there is no legislative history regarding the policy considerations
underlying § 1292(a)(1), there can be little doubt but that Congress want-
ed to prevent the "serious, perhaps irreparable" injury that might result by
adherence to the final judgment rule in cases where an injunction has been
improvidently granted. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S.
176, 181 (1955); see Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 525
(1897); Maxwell v. Enterprise Wall Paper Mfg. Co., 131 F.2d 400, 402
(3d Cir. 1942); Chicago Dollar Directory Co. v. Chicago Directory Co.,
65 Fed. 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1895); Richmond v. Atwood, 52 Fed. 10,
15-16 (1st Cir. 1892). See generally Porter, Appeals From Interlocutory
and Final Decrees in the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, 19
B.U.L. REV. 377 (1939).
5. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 182 (1955).
6. Ibid.; accord, Council of W. Elec. Technical Employees v. Western
Elec. Co., 238 F.2d 892, 894 (2d Cir. 1956).
7. E.g., Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935).
8. E.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
9. E.g., Shanferoke Co. v. Westchester Co., 293 U.S. 449 (1935).
10. See, e.g., Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962); Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
11. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1958).
12. 293 U.S. 379 (1935).
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life insurance policy, and the insurer had raised the equitable de-
fense that the policy had been procured by fraud. The insurer sub-
sequently sought to have the plaintiff's claim stayed pending the
disposition of the equitable issue of fraud raised by his defense.
The trial court granted the petition, and the plaintiff, relying
upon the forerunner of section 1292(a) (1), appealed the ruling
to the court of appeals. The court of appeals accepted jurisdiction
without questioning its power to review this interlocutory or-
der and affirmed the district court.'3 The plaintiff then appealed
to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and declared as a
preliminary matter that the court of appeals did have jurisdiction
to review the interlocutory order because that order constituted
an interlocutory injunction within the meaning of section 1292(a)
(1). The Court said that this section contemplated that those non-
final orders granting or denying injunctive relief under the princi-
ples of equity jurisdiction were interlocutory injunctions." At
common law, a defendant in an action at law who had an inade-
quate remedy because his only defense was equitable could go in-
to equity and seek a temporary injunction to stay the action
at law pending disposition of his defense in an equitable proceed-
ing.'5 Therefore, since the stay order in Enelow was issued in a
proceeding at law in order that an equitable defense could first be
heard, the order was considered an interlocutory injunction for
purposes of a section 1292 (a) (1) appeal."6
The Court's reference to the equity practice of staying the pro-
ceedings was a seemingly indefensible analogy in light of the civil
procedure then in effect. When Enelow was decided, a partial
merger of law and equity had already taken place, 7 and there-
fore, any reference to the common-law power of equity "to stay
proceedings in another court . .. in the enforcement of equitable
principles!" was fictitious since both the action at law and the
equitable defense were pending in the same court. However, even
if this reference to the historical practice is acceptable in the Ene-
low case because it was consistent with the separation of the law
and equity sides of the same court, it would seem indefensible to-
day. Since the Federal Rules adopted the unitary form of action
13. 70 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1934).
14. 293 U.S. at 381.
15. See 1 SMrrH, PRACtiCE OF CHANCERY 2, n.a (2d ed. 1842); Note, 75
HARV. L. REV. 351, 372 n.185 (1961).
16. 293 U.S. at 383.
17. City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 256-57
(1949).
18. 293 U.S. at 382.
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and thereby merged actions at law and equity,1" to preserve the
Enelow doctrine is to preserve the fiction of a court with two
sides, one of which could stay proceedings in the other.
Nevertheless, in Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,"0 a case
decided after the fusion of law and equity, the Court adhered
to the reasoning underlying the Enelow doctrine.2 The Court
held that the relief afforded by section 1292(a)(1) was not re-
stricted to injunctions as such, but applied as well to those orders
that have the effect of injunctions."2 The trial court's order in
Ettelson postponed a jury trial of plaintiff's action at law on cer-
tain insurance policies pending a determination of a counterclaim
raising the equitable defense of fraud. The Supreme Court said
that this order was effective as an injunction and was appealable.
Thus, although the Federal Rules had brought about a merger
of law and equity, the historical differences between those ac-
tions were still the basis for the appealability of the stay order in
Ettelson.
Notwithstanding the failure of the Court in Enelow and Et-
telson to consider the effect of the merger of law and equity on
the appealability of stay orders, the result reached in those cases
seems improper. To allow the appealability of those orders under
section 1292(a)(1) does not accord with the policy under-
lying that statute-to alleviate the "serious, perhaps irreparable"
consequences of an erroneously issued injunction. 3 The interim
harm resulting from the stay orders in Enelow and Ettelson was
not serious and irreparable. If, for example, the plaintiff in each
of those cases had been denied review of an erroneous order
subjecting him to a nonjury trial until there had been a final de-
cision, he would only have suffered the expense and delay of a
needless court trial. This is the usual result in any case that is re-
versed because a trial court issued an improper interlocutory or-
der. It does not, however, in any way affect the party's conduct
outside the courtroom as an interlocutory injunction would.
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
20. 317 U.S. 188 (1942).
21. The defendant in Ettelson argued that Enelow was indefensible
since it was decided before the complete fusion of law and equity.
[Tihis distinction has now been abolished; that equitable defenses,
whether a bar to plaintiff's recovery at law or the basis of affirmative
relief against the plaintiffs, are part and parcel of the single action
initiated by the plaintiffs and that any direction by the court respecting
the order in which the claim and counterclaim are to be heard is
interlocutory, amounting, at most, to a stay of the trial of one branch
of the litigation, and in no sense an injunction against the plaintiffs.
317 U.S. at 191.
22. Id. at 192.
23. See cases and secondary authority cited note 4 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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Cases decided subsequent to Enelow and Ettelson make clear
that appealability of stay orders is restricted to cases involving an
action at law and an order staying the proceedings pending the
determination of an equitable defense. In City of Morgantown v.
Royal Ins. Co., 4 an equitable proceeding, the defendant sought
a stay order to permit the prior determination of a legal counter-
claim. This order was denied and held not to be appealable. Since
it did not enjoin any proceeding, real or fictitious, it did not con-
stitute an interlocutory injunction under section 1292(a) (1). The
Court said that this order merely controlled the order of trial
and was an exercise of the inherent power of the court to maintain
the orderly processes of justice.'
The Morgantown decision resulted in confusion over whether
the Enelow doctrine was still applicable to the question of stay
order appealability."6 For example, some appellate courts inter-
preted Morgantown to mean that appealability of stay orders ex-
isted only in cases where a common-law action was stayed be-
cause of an equitable defense;2" another court of appeals granted
interlocutory appeal if the order stayed a proceeding in equity
pending arbitration.8 The Court's opinion in Baltimore Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. Bodinger,29 however, made clear that the Enelow
doctrine was still in force. Baltimore Contractors was an equitable
proceeding in which the defendant petitioned for a stay order
24. 337 U.S. 254 (1949).
25. Id. at 257-58.
26. The dissenting Justices in Morgantown regarded the majority's de-
cision as rejecting the Enelow doctrine. According to them, the majority
recognized the Federal Rules as having displaced the analogy made under
the Enelow doctrine to common-law practice. On the other hand, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, who concurred in the result, argued that the decision
did not destroy the Enelow doctrine because Enelow was distinguishable
since it involved an action at law interposed with an equitable defense that
was made the basis of the stay order. As a result, he believed that "there
was no intervention by a court of equity in proceedings at law, but 'a
mere stay of a proceeding which a court of law, as well as a court of
equity, may grant' " in determining the sequence of the trial. 337 U.S. at
261.
Others have construed the majority opinion as rejecting the fiction upon
which Enelow rested. See MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL
CODE 0.03(52), at 493 (1949), where the author points out that since the
Court in Morgantown could have applied the "historical analogies and
reached the same result" as Enelow, the mode and sequence of trial should
no longer be considered as an injunction under § 1292(a)(1) and thus appeal-
able in light of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
27. E.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir.
1953).
28. Hudson Lumber Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 181 F.2d 929
(9th Cir. 1950).
29. 348 U.S. 176 (1955).
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pending arbitration of the dispute. The stay order was denied,
and the denial was held not appealable. The Court denied ap-
pealability of this interlocutory order because the technical arrange-
ment of claims required by Enelow-a legal action and an equit-
able defense asserted as the basis for a stay order-was not pres-
ent. 0
The Court's adherence to this distinction based upon the ar-
rangement of legal and equitable claims seems particularly inap-
propriate today. With the merger of law and equity, there has
been an increase in the number of complex cases "in which issues
appear in new combinations extremely difficult to fit wholly into
one category or the other."32 Moreover, recent Supreme Court
decisions have ignored the law-equity dichotomy. The doctrine of
30. Cases decided by federal courts subsequent to Baltimore Contrac-
tors are generally in accord with this interpretation of the case. For ex-
ample, in Kirschner v. West Co., 300 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1962), plain-
tiff sought an accounting of royalties due. The defendant was granted a
stay in the proceeding pending arbitration. The court of appeals interpreted
the Enelow-Baltimore Contractors line of decisions as holding that where
such a stay is granted or denied in an action at law, the order is appeal-
able although it would not be appealable in a suit in equity. The court
went on to say that since plaintiff's claim sounded in equity, the stay of
the proceeding was not appealable under § 1292(a)(1). See Korody
Marine Corp. v. Minerals & Chems. Philipp Corp., 300 F.2d 124 (2d Cir.
1962); Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80 (2d
Cir. 1961). The court in Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844
(5th Cir. 1962), declared that orders staying an action at law to await the
determination of matters pending in state courts are not appealable un-
der § 1292(a)(1). According to the court, the rule that has emerged from
the various decisions is:
An order staying or refusing to stay proceedings in the District Court
is appealable under § 1292(a)(1) only if (A) the action in which the
order was made is an action which, before the fusion of law and equity,
was by its nature an action at law; and (B) the stay is sought to per-
mit the prior determination of some equitable defense or counterclaim.
Id. at 845. See Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.
1955). Orders staying proceedings pending the determination of an ad-
ministrative agency decision have also been held to be not appealable. See
Chronicle Publishing Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 294 F.2d 744
(9th Cir. 1961); New York N.H. & H.R.R. v. Lehigh & N.E.R.R., 287
F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1961); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Tyler Gas Serv.
Co., 247 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1957); Day v. Pennsylvania R.R., 243 F.2d
485 (3d Cir. 1957).
On the other hand, the court in Glen Oaks Util., Inc. v. City of Houston,
280 F.2d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 1960), suggested by way of dicta that the
distinction made in Baltimore Contractors was intended to be abolished by
the Federal Rules, and therefore, a court could adopt a rule that "no dis-
tinction existed as to appealability, between stay orders in law actions and
such orders in equity cases." Id. at 333. Subsequent Fifth Circuit cases,
however, did not adopt such a rule. See, e.g., Jackson Brewing Co. v.
Clarke, supra.
31. See 41 VA. L. REV. 533, 535 (1955).
32. Note, 65 HARV. L. REV. 453, 456 (1952).
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abstention, under which a proceeding in a federal court is stayed
pending the interpretation of a state statute by a state court,
originated in an equitable proceeding, yet recently this doctrine
has been applied in legal actions.3  The decision in Beacon The-
atres, Inc. v. Westover?4 demonstrates that the Court has also de-
parted from the law-equity dichotomy as a basis for determining the
right to a jury trial.' Consistency would dictate that the Court
should also ignore the law-equity dichotomy when considering
the appealability of stay orders.36
The Supreme Court has ignored the law-equity dichotomy in
applying the direct appeal provisions of section 1253 of the Ju-
dicial Code, which provides for direct appeal to the Supreme
Court "from an order granting or denying . . . an interlocu-
tory or permanent injunction" in actions before three-judge
33. The doctrine of abstention originated in Railroad Comm'n v. Pull-
man Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), where the plaintiff brought an action to
enjoin an order of the Texas Railroad Commission. The Commission sought
to justify its order under a Texas statute, but when the suit was appealed,
the Supreme Court found it "far from clear" whether the order was cov-
ered by Texas law. Id. at 499. It then remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to retain jurisdiction of the suit, but to stay its pro-
ceedings until there had been a determination of the statutory meaning in
the state court. The Court justified this procedure by relying upon the
"resources of equity," which include the power to restrain its jurisdiction in
order to promote harmony between the federal and state governments as
well as to avoid considering constitutional questions. Id. at 500.
In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25(1959), however, the Court affirmed a district court's staying its own pro-
ceedings in an eminent domain proceeding to allow the state court to as-
certain the meaning of a disputed state statute, notwithstanding the fact
that the doctrine of abstention was originated in an equitable action. In
effect, the Court in Thibodaux rejected any notion that the abstention doc-
trine is confined to proceedings equitable in nature. See Clay v. Sun Ins.
Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960), where the Court applied the abstention
doctrine in a legal action.
34. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
35. Since Rule 38(a) of the Federal Rules preserved the status quo of
the right to a jury trial in the federal courts, the tendency has been to de-
cide jury trial questions by considering whether the alleged claims are es-
sentially legal or equitable in nature. See McCoid, Right to Jury Trial in
the Federal Courts, 45 IOWA L. REV. 726 (1960); Note, 65 HARv. L.
REV. 453 (1952). However, in Beacon Theatres, where plaintiff sought
declaratory relief plus an injunction and the defendant counterclaimed for
damages and petitioned for a jury trial, the Court did not consider the na-
ture of the relief sought in ruling upon the validity of the trial court's
order denying defendant a jury trial. Instead, the Court simply held that
the right to a jury trial is not destroyed by plaintiff's claim for equitable
relief because recognition must be given to the fact that (1) the flexible
rules of civil procedure provide an adequate remedy at law to the plain-
tiff if there is a prior determination of defendant's legal counterclaim, and(2) the right to a jury trial is a constitutional right.
36. See Glen Oaks Util., Inc. v. City of Houston, 280 F.2d 330, 333(5th Cir. 1960); Note, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351, 374 (1961).
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district courts. 7 In Bryan v. Austin,3 s the plaintiff sought a de-
claratory judgment before a three-judge court to invalidate as un-
constitutional and to enjoin the enforcement of a state statute pro-
hibiting the employment by the state of members of the NAACP.
The court stayed the proceedings before it in order that the mean-
ing of the state statute could be ascertained by the state court.
There was a direct appeal of this ruling to the Supreme Court pur-
suant to the provisions of section 1253. The Court accepted juris-
diction, but remanded the case to the district court.39 The deci-
sion in Bryan was silent regarding the problem of whether a stay
order issued by a three-judge district court applying the doctrine
of abstention may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court under
section 1253, which, like section 1292(a)(1), permits appeal
of orders granting or denying interlocutory injunctions. Under the
Enelow doctrine, section 1292(a) (1) applies to stay orders only
if they are based upon equitable defenses or counterclaims in
actions at law.4" Thus, orders staying proceedings in federal
courts pending the determination of suits before state courts or
administrative agencies have not been considered to be interlocu-
tory injunctions within the meaning of that section.4' The Court
in Bryan in an essentially equitable proceeding, however, applied
a jurisdictional statute containing language similar to that used
in section 1292(a) (1) and accepted without question jurisdiction
of an appeal from an interlocutory order staying the proceedings
in a federal court pending the construction of a state statute in
the state court. The Court probably regarded the stay order as
having the effect of an injunction because it temporarily stopped
the proceeding in the federal court.
Although the appeal in Bryan arose under section 1253, the
Court's disregard for the technical arrangement of claims should
be equally applicable to section 1292(a)(1). Both sections are
similar, for they both permit appellate review of orders granting
or denying interlocutory injunctions. Logically, the same result as
to the appealability of stay orders should be reached under both
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958).
38. 354 U.S. 933 (1957).
39. The state had by this time repealed the statute, and thus, the issue
of whether Bryan was an appropriate case for application of the ab-
stention doctrine had become moot. Ibid.
40. See cases cited note 30 supra and accompanying text.
41. Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1962);
Chronicle Publishing Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 294 F.2d 744
(9th Cir. 1961); New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Lehigh & N.E.R.R., 287
F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1961); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Tyler Gas Serv.
Co., 247 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1957); Day v. Pennsylvania R.R., 243 F.2d
485 (3d Cir. 1957).
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statutes. The result in Bryan seems preferable since it is in ac-
cord with the Court's departure from the law-equity dichotomy
in other areas.'
Arguably, the considerations that prompted the Supreme Court
to depart from the law-equity distinction in cases involving absten-
tion and the right to trial by jury and under section 1253 will
similarly prompt the Court to disregard the dichotomy as a basis
for determining the appealability of stay orders. In fact, the Su-
preme Court's decision in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux" would seem to indicate that the Court is willing to
reject the Enelow doctrine. Thibodaux involved a condemnation
proceeding, a legal action, in which the district court granted a
stay order in applying the abstention doctrine. The plaintiff appeal-
ed the grant of this order, and the circuit court reversed. On pe-
tition for writ of certiorari, the defendant argued that this stay
order was not an interlocutory injunction under the Enelow doc-
trine.;" The Supreme Court, however, accepted jurisdiction with-
out discussing the implications of the Enelow doctrine. Since in
Thibodaux there was a legal action, but the stay order was not
based on an equitable defense, the order should not have been
appealable under Enelow.
This interpretation of Thibodaux is supported by the recent de-
cision in Turner v. City of Memphis," in which the plaintiff
sought to enjoin the discrimination practiced by the defendant.
The defendant responded by asserting that the establishment in-
volved was a private business, not subject to the fourteenth
amendment and that he would violate a Tennessee statute if he
did not segregate his eating facilities. The plaintiff then moved,
before a single district judge, for summary judgment. The defend-
ant countered by alleging that this was an appropriate suit for a
three-judge district court; the district court agreed and convened
a three-judge court. Subsequently, the defendant petitioned for
and received a stay of the proceeding in order that the state court
could interpret the state statute. The plaintiff appealed this stay
order and the order establishing a three-judge court to both the
Supreme Court and the court of appeals. 4" The Supreme Court
42. See text accompanying notes 33 & 35 supra.
43. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
44. Brief for Petitioner, Application for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 10-18.
45. 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
46. The plaintiff appealed the orders to both appellate courts to protect
himself from not making a timely appeal in either court. If, for example,
the plaintiff would have only filed an appeal in the Supreme Court and
the Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
the direct appeals statute because Turner was not an appropriate case for
1963] NOTES 1107
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declared that "a three-judge court was not required, and that
jurisdiction of this appeal is vested in the Court of Appeals."4
The Court did not explain the grounds upon which the court
of appeals had jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal al-
though it would seem that the Court had to face this problem if
the Enelow doctrine has any vitality. Turner did not involve a le-
gal action and a stay order based on an equitable defense, for the
district court merely granted the stay to permit the state court to
ascertain the meaning of a state statute. Therefore, it would seem
that the effect of the Supreme Court's declaring that the court of
appeals had jurisdiction to hear this appeal is that the Court has
rejected the interpretation given to section 1292(a) (1) in Ene-
low.
If the Supreme Court has in fact rejected the Enelow doctrine,
it is then necessary to formulate a new standard governing the
appealability of stay orders under section 1292(a)(1). The first
requirement for appealability is that there be an order granting
or denying an injunction. In Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co.,4" the Court stated that section 1292 (a) (1) is not restricted
in scope to those orders that are literally "injunctions." Rather,
it is necessary in deciding what orders grant or deny injunc-
tions to look to the substantial effect of the orders. Although the
Court in Morgantown and Baltimore Contractors construed this
language in Ettelson to mean that only equitably-based stay or-
ders granted in actions at law are effective as injunctions, a more
logical test, in light of the merger of law and equity, is to consider
stay orders to be in the nature of injunctions where that is their
operative effect.49 Because any stay order, by stopping the pro-
ceedings, has the effect of an injunction, any order granting or
denying the stay of proceedings should meet this requirement.50
a three-judge court, the plaintiff would then have to appeal the orders to
the court of appeals. At that time, however, the time for appeal might
have expired.
47. 369 U.S. at 353. The Court, nonetheless, went on to decide the case
by treating defendant's "jurisdictional statement as a petition for writ of
certiorari prior to judgment in the Court of Appeals." Id. at 353-54.
48. 317 U.S. 188 (1942).
49. The dissenting justices in Morgantown and Baltimore Contractors
regarded § 1292(a)(1) as making "all stay orders appealable that have the
substantive effect of interlocutory injunction orders." Baltimore Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 185 (1955).
50. This construction of what constitutes an order granting or deny-
ing an injunction for purposes of a § 1292(a)(1) appeal seems to be in
accordance with the interpretation the Court has given that same language
in § 1253. When the Court in Bryan v. Austin, 354 U.S. 933 (1957), ac-
cepted jurisdiction of a direct appeal from a stay order issued by a three-judge district court applying the abstention doctrine, the Court appeared
to determine whether the effect of the order was to grant an injunction.
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This is not to suggest, however, that the appeal of stay orders
should be allowed in all cases where such orders have the effect
of injunctions. Since section 1292(a) (1) was enacted to prevent
"serious, perhaps irreparable" injury that could result from orders
granting or denying injunctions, a stay order must also produce
that degree of injury to be appealable under this section." Under
this standard, few if any stay orders would ever be appealable
under section 1292(a) (1) since such orders do not enjoin a liti-
gant's conduct outside of the proceedings. In the Enelow-Balti-
more Contractors line of cases, the stay orders would not be ap-
pealable; the interim harm of delay and additional expense re-
sulting from having to await a final judgment before a question
as to the availability of a jury trial or arbitration may be reviewed
does not amount to the kind of harm that section 1292(a) (1) was
intended to prevent. Injury of this sort will always be present when
a trial court has issued an improper interlocutory order. The
concern that the courts have to safeguard the right of trial by jury
should not justify interrupting the progress of a trial where there
has been an erroneous denial of a jury trial. This right can always
be asserted after there has been a final decision. Stay orders is-
sued under the abstention doctrine will similarly not satisfy the re-
quirements imposed by this test even though they are likely to
come within the literal language of section 1292(a) (1). They have
the effect of injunctions because they do temporarily "enjoin"
proceedings in the federal courts. Nevertheless, if such orders are
erroneously issued, there will not be irreparable injury, but rather
the ordinary delays and expenses that result from reversible in-
terlocutory orders.5
51. See cases and secondary authority cited note 4 supra and accom-
panying text for an insight into what Congress endeavored to remedy by
enacting § 1292(a)(1).
52. It may not always be necessary to resort to § 1292(a)(1) to obtain
review of orders granting or denying a stay if § 1292(b), which was added
by amendment in 1958 to provide for discretionary appeal of interlocutory
orders, is applicable. See Note, 69 YALE L.J. 333, 352, 357 (1959), which
suggests that orders "staying the action" and governing the order of trial
satisfy the requirements of appealability under § 1292(b).
The writ of mandamus may also provide litigants with supplementary
means for appellate review of orders granting or denying a stay. Applica-
tion of the writ of mandamus has been considered appropriate in cases
where there has been a disregard by a district judge of the constitutionally
protected right to a jury trial. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500 (1959); Black v. Boyd, 248 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1957); Bereslavsky
v. Kloeb, 162 F.2d 862 (6th Cir. 1947); Bereslavsky v. Caffey, 161 F.2d
499 (2nd Cir. 1947). It has been suggested that the courts should also
give greater application of the writ of mandamus to review interlocutory
orders. See 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.1016] (2d ed. 1953); Note,
The Writ of Mandamus: A Possible Ansver to the Final Judgment Rule,
50 COLU. L. REV. 1102,1112-13 (1950).
1963] 1109
0
